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We report an experiment that compared two explanations for the effect of congruency between 
a word’s on screen spatial position and its meaning. On one account, congruency is explained 
by the match between position and a mental simulation of meaning. Alternatively, congruency 
is explained by the polarity alignment principle. To distinguish between these accounts we 
presented the same object names (e.g., shark, helicopter) in a sky decision task or an ocean 
decision task, such that response polarity and typical location were disentangled. Sky decision 
responses were faster to words at the top of the screen compared to words at the bottom 
of the screen, but the reverse was found for ocean decision responses. These results are 
problematic for the polarity principle, and support the claim that spatial attention is directed by 
mental simulation of the task-relevant conceptual dimension.
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similar interference effect without explicit imagery instructions. 
In their task, participants viewed word pairs in the center of the 
screen that referred to objects with typical vertical locations 
(cowboy hat or cowboy boot). Immediately after presentation of 
the word pair, a target letter appeared at the top or the bottom 
of the screen. The participant’s task was to identify the letter as 
quickly as possible. Estes et al. found that letter identification was 
slower and less accurate if the letter’s position matched the typical 
location of the word’s referent than if the position mismatched. 
They did not report the separate effects for items at the top and 
bottom positions. Similar results were found by Richardson et al. 
(2003; see also Bergen et al., 2007). They presented sentences in 
which a verb had a horizontal (push) or vertical (sink) orienta-
tion, followed by a visual target. The target could appear at one 
of four locations on the computer screen; at the top or bottom 
(horizontally centered), or on the left or right (vertically centered). 
They found that the orientation of the verb interfered with the 
position of the visual target. For example, following the vertical 
word sink, responses to targets presented on the vertical axis (top 
or bottom) were slower than to targets presented on the horizontal 
axis (left or right).
Other studies, using somewhat different designs, found facilita-
tion if word meaning and spatial location were congruent. Bergen 
et al. (2007) noted that findings of interference or facilitation 
might be due to differences in timing, but both effects are still 
explained by the same simulation account. For example, Šetic´ and 
Domijan (2007) presented words referring to flying or non-flying 
animals at the top or bottom of the computer screen. Participants 
decided whether the word referred to a flying or non-flying animal. 
Decisions were faster and more accurate for words in a congruent 
than incongruent position (e.g., performance was better for stork 
at the top than at the bottom of the screen). This may be due to a 
congruency between word meaning and position.
IntroductIon
Previous studies found interactions between the meaning of 
words and the screen location where the words were presented 
(i.e., spatial position). For instance, people were faster to decide 
that a stork flies if the word stork was presented at the top of 
the screen rather than at the bottom of the screen (Šetic´ and 
Domijan, 2007). Similar effects were found in a semantic related-
ness judgment task (Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003) and also in a letter 
identification task in which participants identified a single letter 
(X or O) presented at the top or bottom of the screen immediately 
following the name of an object with a typical location (e.g., cow-
boy boot, Estes et al., 2008). Researchers also found interactions 
between word meaning and spatial position when words refer 
to more abstract concepts, such as valence or power (Richardson 
et al., 2003; Meier and Robinson, 2004; Schnall and Clore, 2004; 
Schubert, 2005; Meier et al., 2007; Zanolie et al., submitted; but 
see Bergen et al., 2007). Although these abstract concepts have 
no inherent perceptual spatial positions, they are connected to 
spatial concepts through metaphorical relations such as good is 
up and bad is down. These interactions between word meaning 
and spatial location provide important insight into the underlying 
mental representations of meaning.
This paper compares two explanations for the interaction 
between word meaning and spatial position. The first explana-
tion is that readers understand the meaning of a category by 
mentally simulating associated sensory-motor information (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999). Thus, a representation of the meaning of fly-
ing animal involves simulating looking up at the sky and seeing 
the animal fly. Because such simulations occupy sensory-motor 
systems, they might interfere with other sensory-motor process-
ing. Indeed, interference was found when people simultaneously 
performed mental visual imagery and a visual perception task 
(Craver Lemley and Reeves, 1992). Estes et al. (2008) showed a 
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a lack of counterbalancing between the yes/no answer and spatial 
position. After all, there was no condition in which the task was 
reversed, such that non-flying animals required a yes-response (e.g., 
by asking is this a land animal?).
In sum, stimuli in a task may have polarity values based on 
markedness, on task-specific judgment (“yes” or “no”), and on 
spatial position (up or down). In addition, responses also have 
polarity values, for example based on the spatial position of 
the manual responses. Thus, rather than supporting a theory of 
meaning representation through mental simulation, these con-
gruency effects may instead reflect polarity alignment if the role 
of yes/no response assignment is not counterbalanced or not 
independently manipulated.
To investigate whether the effects of spatial position of a tar-
get stimulus are better explained by polarity alignment or by 
congruence with mental representations, we used two semantic 
judgment tasks for which the same stimuli required opposite 
responses. One task was an ocean judgment (Is it usually found 
in the ocean?) and the other task was a sky judgment (Is it usually 
found in the sky?). These tasks were chosen because sky and ocean 
have clear spatial positions but neither one is a linguistically 
marked or unmarked end of a dimension. While most people 
will have more experience with looking at things in the sky than 
in the ocean, our study was run in San Diego, which is situated 
on the Pacific coast. Therefore, the participants in our study had 
above average experience with looking at the ocean. Because 
perceptual simulation involves activation of previous perceptual 
experiences we assumed that simulations of seeing things in the 
sky and ocean would most likely take the perspective of someone 
standing on land looking straight ahead, with the sky taking up 
the top half of visual field and the ocean taking up the bottom 
half of the visual field. The same set of stimuli was used in the 
two tasks, and consisted of names of things that are typically 
found in one of the two locations (e.g., whale, submarine, eagle, 
helicopter). Each word was presented at the top or bottom of the 
screen. Subjects responded using their two hands, and whether 
the “yes” response was given by the left or right hand was coun-
terbalanced across participants.
The role of conceptual congruency and polarity alignment can 
be disentangled by a between task comparison of the interaction 
between word category and stimulus position. If spatial congruency 
effects are due to mental simulation, then spatial attention should 
be directed towards the top of the screen in the sky decision task 
but towards the bottom of the screen in the ocean decision task. 
This predicts that in general, reaction times to words at the top of 
the screen should be faster in the sky task whereas reaction times 
to words at the bottom of the screen should be faster in the ocean 
task. Beyond this task congruency effect, the mental simulation 
account also predicts a word congruency effect. For this effect of 
congruency between a referent’s typical location and the position 
of the word, performance should be better for sky words presented 
at the top of the screen as compared to sky words presented at the 
bottom of the screen. Similarly, performance should be better for 
ocean words presented at the bottom of the screen as compared 
to ocean words presented at the top of the screen. Critically, these 
effects should occur regardless of the task (i.e., regardless of the 
yes/no response).
Additionally, the task itself – deciding whether or not  animals 
fly – might have directed spatial attention. In order to perform 
the flying animal task, participants may have systematically 
directed their mental simulations, and thus their spatial atten-
tion, towards the sky. Although Šetic´ and Domijan (2007) did 
not find a main effect of position, other studies show such main 
effects (e.g., Schubert, 2005). On this account, there may be both 
a general task-related benefit for words presented at the top of 
the screen (through spatial attention) as well as a word specific 
benefit for flying animals presented at the top of the screen 
(because the mental simulation would be easier for a word in 
this position). Therefore, in the current study, we tested both 
task congruency (e.g., benefits for all words at the top) as well 
as word congruency (e.g., additional benefits for flying animals 
at the top).
A second explanation for these congruency effects lies in the 
response selection process rather than the representation of mean-
ing. Proctor and Cho (2006; see also Bar-Anan et al., 2007) proposed 
that in many binary decision tasks, the speed of response selec-
tion is affected by polarity correspondence. Stimulus dimensions 
with binary values are encoded as having a + (plus) polarity or 
− (minus) polarity. In a similar vein, response alternatives are also 
encoded as + or −. Response selection is faster when stimulus and 
response polarities correspond than when they do not correspond. 
According to Proctor and Cho, the polarity coding of dimensions 
and responses is not entirely random. Certain dimensions are 
always coded in the same way. For example, a “yes” response is 
typically represented as + and a “no” response is represented as 
−. Up is represented as + and down is represented as −. Right is 
represented as + and left is represented as −. Accordingly, right key 
presses are coded as + and left key presses are coded as −.
Related to this idea, Klatzky et al. (1973) argued that many 
conceptual dimensions (e.g., height, valence) also have polarity. 
Furthermore, the adjectives representing the opposite ends of these 
dimensions consist of a default, positive, or unmarked member 
(e.g., tall, good) that can also be used to name the dimension in its 
entirety and a negative, or marked member (e.g., short, bad) that 
is only used to name one end of the dimension. For example, the 
question How tall is he? is neutral as to actual size, whereas the 
question How short is he? suggests that the person is unusually 
short. Such markedness may play a role in binary decision tasks 
as well. For example, in judgments of power, powerful may be the 
unmarked (positive) end and powerless may be the marked (nega-
tive) end of the power dimension. Alignment of powerful with up 
therefore leads to faster processing than alignment of powerful with 
down (Schubert, 2005). Polarity correspondence can also explain 
similar results that examined spatial congruency with concepts such 
as valence or number magnitude (Fischer et al., 2003; Meier and 
Robinson, 2004; Santens and Gevers, 2008; Bae et al., 2009; but see 
Chiou et al., 2009).
These polarity correspondences might also explain the results 
of Šetic´ and Domijan (2007). In their task, the flying animals 
always required a “yes” response and the non-flying animals always 
required a “no” response. Therefore, in the congruent condition, 
the polarities of position and response (up-yes and down-no) were 
aligned, whereas they were misaligned in the incongruent condi-
tion (up-no and down-yes). On this account, the results are due to 
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Procedure
Participants in the ocean decision task were instructed to decide 
whether an item could be found in the ocean. Participants in the 
sky decision task were instructed to decide whether an item could 
be found in the sky. Items were presented individually and in ran-
dom order on the computer screen following the procedure used by 
Šetic´ and Domijan (2007). A trial started with a sequence of three 
consecutive fixation cues (“+ + +”) presented for 300 ms each, which 
served to warn participants whether the target word would appear 
at the top or bottom. The first fixation was presented in the center 
of the computer screen. In the top condition, the second fixation 
was presented at 40% from the top of the screen, the third at 30% 
from the top of the screen, followed by the target word at 20% from 
the top of the screen. In the bottom condition these positions were 
at 40%, 30%, and 20% from the bottom of the screen respectively. 
This sequence of fixations cues did not induce a sense of upwards 
or downwards motion because the vertical distance between fixa-
tions was too great (i.e., there was no apparent motion). The target 
word was presented immediately after the final fixation cue and 
remained on the screen until the participant responded or 2,500 ms 
elapsed. Participants pressed the z or m key of the computer key-
board to indicate a “yes” or “no” response. Feedback was provided for 
1,500 ms if the response was incorrect (“INCORRECT”) or slower 
than 2,500 ms (“TOO SLOW”). The next trial started immediately 
after the response or, in the case of feedback, after the feedback mes-
sage. Every target word was tested twice, with the first occurrence 
during a first block of trials followed by a second occurrence during 
a second block of trials. Half of the items in a block were assigned 
to the top position and the other half to the bottom position such 
that ocean words and sky words were presented equally often at each 
position. In the second block, the screen position for each word was 
reversed. Within blocks, the items were presented in random order. 
The two blocks were presented without interruption. The order of 
blocks was counterbalanced between participants, as was assignment 
of the m and z keys to the “yes” and “no” responses.
results
Correct reaction times were trimmed by removing reaction 
times that were more than three standard deviations from the 
participant’s mean for the corresponding response (2.04% of 
the correct RTs). As block did not interact with any other vari-
able, we collapsed the data across blocks. The mean reaction 
times are presented in Table 1 and the error rates are presented 
If, on the other hand, congruency effects are due to polarity 
alignment, performance should be better for “yes” responses 
to words presented at the top of the screen as compared to 
“yes” responses to words presented at the bottom of the screen. 
Furthermore, performance should be better for “no” responses 
to words presented at the bottom of the screen as compared 
to “no” responses to words presented at the top of the screen. 
Critically, these effects should occur regardless of the typical 
location (ocean or sky) of the word’s referent (i.e., regardless 
of the word’s meaning). Thus, in the ocean decision task, per-
formance should be better for ocean words at the top and sky 
words at the bottom than for the opposite positions. Moreover, 
because the right hand is coded as + polarity and the left hand 
as − polarity (according to Proctor and Cho, 2006) this effect 
may be restricted or at least most pronounced when “yes” 
responses are given with the right hand and “no” responses are 
given with the left hand.
In summary, the mental simulation account predicts both task 
congruency effects (task and location) and word congruency effects 
(word and location), whereas polarity alignment only predicts 
response congruency effects (response and location).
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
One hundred and two UCSD students participated for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to the ocean decision (n = 52) 
or sky decision task (n = 50).
stIMulI
A set of 80 words was created. Forty words referred to things usu-
ally found in the ocean (e.g., whale, submarine) and 40 referred to 
things usually found in the sky (e.g., eagle, helicopter). The com-
plete set of stimuli is given in the Appendix. The stimuli were 
selected from a larger set that had been tested in a pilot study. In 
this pilot study 50 participants made ocean or sky decisions (25 
participants in each task) to a larger set of words presented indi-
vidually in random order in the center of the computer screen. 
From this larger set, 80 words were selected for which catego-
rization agreement between participants was greater than 75% 
(M = 92%). The two sets of words were comparable on word 
length, log word frequency, and number of items from different 
types of taxonomic categories (e.g., animals, man-made objects, 
natural objects, persons).
Table 1 | Mean reaction times and standard errors in the two semantic decision tasks as a function of word position, word category, and response 
instruction.
 Ocean words Sky words
 Yes right Yes left Yes right Yes left
  M SE M SE M SE M SE
Ocean decision Bottom 717 17 690 13 751 15 732 18
 Top 722 18 692 15 768 18 739 17
Sky decision Bottom 693 15 765 22 685 14 725 20
  Top 689 16 751 21 674 14 709 19
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FigurE 2 | Mean error rates in the two semantic decision tasks as a function of word category and word position. Error bars represent confidence intervals 
for the word category × position within-subjects interaction (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
Table 2 | Mean error scores and standard errors in the two semantic decision tasks as a function of word position, word category, and response 
instruction.
 Ocean words Sky words
 Yes right Yes left Yes right Yes left
  M SE M SE M SE M SE
Ocean decision Bottom 0.057 0.009 0.059 0.007 0.070 0.012 0.055 0.010
 Top 0.057 0.009 0.048 0.008 0.079 0.013 0.059 0.009
Sky decision Bottom 0.076 0.012 0.054 0.009 0.079 0.013 0.067 0.010
  Top 0.065 0.011 0.049 0.008 0.060 0.011 0.054 0.009
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FigurE 1 | Mean reaction times in the two semantic decision tasks as a function of word category and word position. Error bars represent confidence 
intervals for the word category × position within-subjects interaction (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
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The polarity principle predicted an interaction between task, 
category, and position. This is because the combination of task and 
category defines whether “yes” or “no” is the correct response to a par-
ticular target word. In other words, in the sky task, responses should be 
easier to sky words at the top of the screen (“yes” responses), whereas 
in the ocean task, responses should be easier to ocean words at the top 
of the screen (also “yes” responses). However, there was no three-way 
interaction between task, category, and position either in terms of RT 
or error rate, F < 1 for RTs and F(1,98) = 2.12, p = 0.15 for error rate. 
The polarity principle also predicted that this response and position 
effect should be more pronounced for right-hand “yes” responses to 
words at the top position and for left-hand “no” responses to words at 
the bottom position. This interaction between position, task, category, 
and instruction was not significant for RTs or error rate, both Fs < 1. 
Thus, there was no evidence that responses were facilitated when “yes” 
responses were aligned with the top position.
The only significant interaction that might be attributed to 
the polarity principle was between instruction, task, and category, 
F(1,98) = 4.59, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.05 for RTs but F(1,98) = 1.07, p = 0.30 
for error rate. Numerically, this interaction showed that in the sky 
decision task, right-hand responses were faster for sky words (“yes” 
responses) than for ocean words (“no” responses), whereas left-hand 
responses were faster for ocean words than sky words. In the ocean 
decision task, however, right- and left-hand responses were both 
faster for ocean words than sky words. Collapsing across tasks, par-
ticipants were faster to give a “no” response with their left than with 
their right hand, while there was no difference for “yes” responses, 
but these simple effects were not statistically significant. These effects 
might be consistent with a polarity account in which “no” and left-
hand responses are both coded as – polarity and responses were 
faster when these polarities were aligned. However, the polarity 
account also predicts that responses should be faster when “yes” 
and right-hand responses were aligned (both + polarity), which 
was not the case. Moreover this effect did not interact with spatial 
position and thus cannot explain spatial congruency effects.
Conceptual congruency based on mental simulation predicted 
both a task congruency effect as well as a word congruency effect. In 
support of this account, there was a significant interaction between 
task and position, F(1,98) = 15.97, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.14 for RTs and 
F(1,98) = 3.61, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.04 for error rate. In the ocean decision 
task, responses were faster to target words at the bottom than at the 
top, F(1,51) = 5.05, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.09, and in the sky decision task 
responses were faster and more accurate to target words at the top 
than at the bottom, F(1,49) = 11.97, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.196 for RTs 
and F(1,49) = 5.94, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.11 for error rate. Thus, there was 
a highly reliable task congruency effect, although this effect did not 
interact significantly with word category, all ps > 0.20. Conceptual 
congruency also predicted that performance would be better for sky 
words at the top and ocean words at the bottom in both tasks, because 
these are typical positions for the entities referred to by these words. 
However, there was no interaction at all between word category and 
position, both Fs < 1. Thus, the current experiment failed to replicate 
the word congruency effect reported by Šetic´ and Domijan (2007).
In addition to these results, the ANOVA on RTs showed a theoreti-
cally uninteresting main effect of category, F(1,98) = 4.08, p = 0.05, 
η2 = 0.04, and an interaction between category and task, F(1,98) = 73.02, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43. Overall, responses were faster to ocean than sky 
in Table 2. Figures 1 and 2 show the RT data and error rates 
collapsed across instruction. Separate ANOVAs (Task × Categ
ory × Instruction × Positio ) were performed on the RTs and 
error rates. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 3 
and 4. The factors Task (ocean vs. sky decision) and Instruction 
(yes-is-right vs. yes-is-left) were between-subject factors, while 
Category (ocean vs. sky word) and Position (up vs. down) were 
within-subject factors.
Next, we report all significant results of both the RT and error 
rate ANOVAs. We do so in an intermixed fashion, such that for a 
given effect, both the RT and error rate results are simultaneously 
reported (if both were significant). In this manner, it can be ascer-
tained whether speed and accuracy traded off against each other 
(e.g., RT and error rate changing in opposite directions), or whether 
there was general performance change (e.g., just an RT effect, just 
an error rate effect, or situations where RT and accuracy went in 
the same direction).
Table 3 | Complete ANOVA results for reaction times.
Effect F p η2
Target category 4.08 0.05 0.04
Target category × Task 73.02 0.001 0.43
Target category × Instruction 2.31 0.13 0.02
Target category × Task × Instruction 4.59 0.04 0.05
Target position 0.69 0.41 0.01
Target position × Task 15.97 0.001 0.14
Target position × Instruction 2.28 0.13 0.02
Target position × Task × Instruction 0.01 0.91 0.00
Target category × Position 0.25 0.62 0.00
Target category × Position × Task 0.10 0.76 0.00
Target category × Position × Instruction 0.05 0.83 0.00
Target category × Position × Task × Instruction 0.31 0.58 0.00
Task 0.84 0.36 0.00
Instruction 0.61 0.44 0.01
Task × Instruction 5.67 0.02 0.06
Table 4 | Complete ANOVA results for error rate.
Effect F p η2
Target category 2.05 0.16 0.02
Target category × Task 0.41 0.52 0.00
Target category × Instruction 0.04 0.84 0.00
Target category × Task × Instruction 1.07 0.30 0.01
Target position 3.48 0.07 0.03
Target position × Task 3.61 0.06 0.04
Target position × Instruction 0.01 0.92 0.00
Target position × Task × Instruction 1.40 0.24 0.01
Target category × Position 0.09 0.77 0.00
Target category × Position × Task 2.12 0.15 0.02
Target category × Position × Instruction 0.04 0.84 0.00
Target category × Position × Task × Instruction 0.04 0.84 0.00
Task 0.11 0.75 0.00
Instruction 2.55 0.11 0.03
Task × Instruction 0.05 0.82 0.00
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power dimension, powerful always has + polarity. Therefore, it was 
impossible to disentangle polarity alignment and meaning congru-
ency. In the present study, we gave the same stimuli + or − polarity 
by changing the decision task, and we manipulated response side 
orthogonally. Therefore, the absence of any effect of polarity align-
ment in the current experiment indicates that, at least for semantic 
tasks, the polarity principle does not contribute to performance.
The semantic congruency account predicted an interaction between 
word meaning and spatial position, but we did not find such an inter-
action. Previous findings (Richardson et al., 2003; Šetic´ and Domijan, 
2007; Estes et al., 2008) were explained by congruency between a per-
ceptual simulation of the word’s meaning and the spatial position or 
orientation of the target. It should be noted that such congruency 
effects differ widely. Estes et al. and Richardson et al. found interference 
when the visual target’s position or orientation was congruent with the 
meaning of the preceding word. In contrast, Šetic´ and Domijan (2007) 
obtained facilitation rather than interference for congruent stimuli. 
In the current experiment, we found neither interference nor facilita-
tion between word position and word meaning. Rather, we observed 
a task-wide advantage of the spatial location of the target, regardless 
of the specific meaning of the target word. Thus, the diversity of these 
findings indicates that the nature of spatial congruency effects is not 
fully clear yet. Some researchers (Estes et al., 2008) have postulated 
two loci for congruency effects. First, concepts that are associated to 
typical locations direct spatial attention toward their typical location. 
Second, simulations have perceptual details that are represented by 
sensory-motor systems. This might interfere with processing when 
simulation and perception occur simultaneously and differ in percep-
tual details (e.g., simulation of a cowboy boot and identification of the 
letter X). In contrast, the simulation may facilitate visual processing 
when simulation and visual target share perceptual details or when 
the simulation and visual target are presented sequentially (Bergen 
et al., 2007). Therefore, whether spatial congruency results in benefits 
or deficits and whether this effect is found for individual words or 
task-wide categories may depend on procedural details. These details 
may include the timing of spatial target presentation compared to 
the process of mental simulation, whether the simulated concept is 
concrete (e.g., cowboy boot) or abstract (e.g., power) (see Bergen et al., 
2007), and what task is performed on the spatial target. Regardless of 
these procedural details, our results show that it is unlikely that the 
polarity principle can explain spatial congruency effects.
An explanation for our results that may also explain other find-
ings is that the task directed spatial attention to the location that was 
congruent with the decision category. When the task was to decide 
whether a word referred to an entity typically found in the sky, par-
ticipants directed their attention to the top of the screen, and when the 
task was to decide whether a word referred to an entity typically found 
in the ocean, participants directed their attention to the bottom of the 
screen. This task-specific spatial attention can be explained by mental 
simulation of the task-relevant location rather than specific entities. 
While performing the sky decision task, participants might mentally 
simulate looking at the sky without filling in perceptual details such 
as objects with specific shapes and colors. Because such task-induced 
spatial attention does not involve a simulation with many perceptual 
details, it will not interfere with perception of the target word. Instead, 
increased attention at the task-congruent location facilitated process-
ing of the target word, resulting in faster responses.
words. In the ocean decision task this was also the case, but in the sky 
decision task responses were faster to sky than to ocean words, indi-
cating that “yes” responses were faster than “no” responses. This effect 
provides a manipulation check because it shows that the polarity of the 
items was reversed by the task. No other effects were significant.
dIscussIon
In two semantic decision tasks (ocean decisions and sky decisions) 
performance was better for words that were presented at a posi-
tion that was congruent with the task. Specifically, performance 
was better for words at the bottom than at the top of the screen in 
ocean decision and better for words at the top than at the bottom 
of the screen in sky decision. This finding is not explained by the 
polarity principle, but it was expected by the perceptual simulation 
account if the systematic nature of the task (e.g., a long sequence 
of sky decisions) caused participants to direct their attention to the 
task appropriate position of the screen, which is something they 
might do to properly simulate words in the task indicated location 
(sky or ocean). We will return to this explanation below.
The present results do not support the polarity principle. 
According to this principle, task performance is facilitated by 
alignment of polarities between response and stimulus dimen-
sions (Proctor and Cho, 2006). In the present study this principle 
predicted that the “yes” response, top position of the target word, 
and the right-hand response would be aligned because they are 
all coded as + polarity, and the opposites (“no” response, bottom 
position, left-hand response) would be aligned because they are 
all coded as − polarity. However, our results showed no advantage 
when polarity was aligned: there were neither polarity effects when 
only considering response and screen position nor when consider-
ing response, screen position, and response hand.
This failure to find polarity effects is consistent with previous 
studies finding results in one condition that might be interpreted 
in terms of polarity alignment, but then failing to find these results 
in a complementary condition (Meier and Robinson, 2004; Van 
Dantzig, 2009; Boot and Pecher, 2010). In these studies, effects of 
congruency between spatial position and concept were observed 
when considering a sequence of events that went from concept to 
position (e.g., from power judgment to visual target identification) 
but not in going from position to concept (e.g., from location deci-
sion to power judgment). For example, Van Dantzig found that 
power judgments of words (e.g., dictator) had an effect on subse-
quent identification of a letter presented at the top or bottom of 
the screen. In a separate experiment, identification of letters (e.g., 
a p at the top of the screen) did not have an effect on subsequent 
power judgments. Thus, power judgment affected spatial atten-
tion, but spatial attention did not affect power judgments. In both 
experiments, position and power had binary polarities. If polarity 
alignment was the cause of the congruency effects in the concept 
followed by position experiment, there should have also been con-
gruency effects for the position followed by concept experiment. 
Landy et al. (2008) noted that the polarity principle is a general 
principle that should be observed consistently. Thus, the asymmetry 
found in these studies is problematic for the polarity principle.
One complication with previous findings is that the stimulus 
dimensions had polarities that were mostly fixed. For example, in 
the up–down spatial dimension, up always has + polarity, and in the 
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dimension in which the positive exemplars were congruent with 
the bottom position, it is impossible to say  conclusively whether 
the advantage for stimuli at the top position was due to task-
induced spatial attention or a more general advantage for stimuli 
at the top. However, these previous studies are consistent with the 
present findings and our explanation.
In conclusion, we did not find evidence for the polarity align-
ment principle. We also did not find evidence for interaction 
between word position and word meaning. Our results did show, 
however, that semantic decision tasks direct spatial attention in a 
more global way. It may be that people perform a mental simulation 
of the task-congruent location, which directs spatial attention and 
facilitates processing of targets in that location.
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This attentional explanation is consistent with other findings 
in which lower level perceptual information facilitated higher 
level conceptual processing (Van Dantzig et al., 2008). In Van 
Dantzig et al.’s study, participants verified concept-property pairs 
(e.g., banana-yellow) presented as words. Responses were faster 
for pairs that were preceded by a simple perceptual stimulus 
from the same modality as the property (e.g., a flashing light) 
than from a different modality (e.g., a burst of white noise). In 
this study the correspondence between perception and repre-
sentation was at a more global level, namely the activation of a 
sensory modality, rather than at the level of specific perceptual 
details. In other studies investigating the effect of spatial position 
of words on conceptual processing (Meier and Robinson, 2004; 
Schubert, 2005; Meier et al., 2007), the task-relevant dimension 
was always congruent with the top position (e.g., valence, power, 
divinity), which provides an opportunity to assess whether there 
may have been an attentional effect similar to the current results. 
Close inspection of the results shows that, at least numerically, 
responses were faster to words presented at the top than at the 
bottom of the screen. Because these studies did not use a second 
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aPPendIx
Ocean words: algae, anchor, anemone, clam, cod, coral, crab, diver, 
diving mask, dolphin, fishing net, flipper, flounder, herring, jellyfish, 
kelp, lobster, mermaid, octopus, otter, oyster, plankton, reef, salmon, 
salt, sand, scallop, seal, shark, shell, ship wreck, shrimp, snorkel, squid, 
submarine, tsunami, tuna, turtle, wetsuit, whale.
Sky words: angel, astronaut, balloon, bat, bluejay, cardinal, cloud, 
comet, eagle, fairy, falcon, fireworks, hawk, helicopter, hummingbird, 
jet, kite, lightning, meteor, missile, moon, owl, parachute, pigeon, pilot, 
plane, planet, rainbow, raven, robin, rocket, satellite, sparrow, star, 
starling, sun, Superman, tornado, ufo, vulture.
